Biggest Culprit: The Lenders
Most of the blame should be pointed at the
mortgage originators (lenders) for creating these problems. It was the lenders who ultimately lent funds to people with poor credit and a high risk of default. (To learn more about subprime lending, see
Subprime Is Often Subpar.)
When the central banks flooded the markets with capital liquidity, it not only lowered interest rates, it also broadly depressed
risk premiums as investors sought riskier opportunities to bolster their investment returns. At the same time, lenders found themselves with ample capital to lend and, like investors, an increased willingness to undertake additional risk to increase their investment returns.
In defense of the lenders, there was an increased demand for mortgages, and housing prices were increasing because interest rates had dropped substantially. At the time, lenders probably saw subprime mortgages as less of a risk than they really were: rates were low, the economy was healthy and people were making their payments.
As you can see in Figure 1, subprime mortgage
originations grew from $173 billion in 2001 to a record level of $665 billion in 2005, which represented an increase of nearly 300%. There is a clear relationship between the liquidity following September 11, 2001, and subprime loan originations; lenders were clearly willing and able to provide borrowers with the necessary funds to purchase a home.
Partner In Crime: Homebuyers
While we're on the topic of lenders, we should also mention the home buyers. Many were playing an extremely risky game by buying houses they could barely afford. They were able to make these purchases with non-traditional mortgages (such as
2/28 and
interest-only mortgages) that offered low introductory rates and minimal initial costs such as "no down payment". Their hope lay in price appreciation, which would have allowed them to
refinance at lower rates and take the equity out of the home for use in other spending. However, instead of continued appreciation, the housing bubble burst, and prices dropped rapidly. (To learn more, read
Why Housing Market Bubbles Pop.)
As a result, when their mortgages reset, many homeowners were unable to
refinance their mortgages to lower rates, as there was no
equity being created as housing prices fell. They were, therefore, forced to reset their mortgage at higher rates, which many could not afford. Many homeowners were simply forced to default on their mortgages. Foreclosures continued to increase through 2006 and 2007.
In their exuberance to hook more subprime borrowers, some lenders or mortgage brokers may have given the impression that there was no risk to these mortgages and that the costs weren't that high; however, at the end of the day, many borrowers simply assumed mortgages they couldn't reasonably afford. Had they not made such an aggressive purchase and assumed a less risky mortgage, the overall effects might have been manageable. (To learn about moral debate surrounding all things subprime, read
Subprime Lending: Helping Hand Or Underhanded?)
Exacerbating the situation, lenders and investors of securities backed by these defaulting mortgages suffered. Lenders lost money on defaulted mortgages as they were increasingly left with property that was worth less than the amount originally loaned. In many cases, the losses were large enough to result in bankruptcy.
And more visit to
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-blame.asp
